

A new method for 3D mask detection in face recognition systems

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Abstract— In this article, we propose a method for the detection of hackers who try to deceive face recognition systems, by using 3D masks of people belonging to the system database. We first test the robustness of a well-established recognition method to attacks by 3D masks, using 3DMAD database which consists of real faces and faces with 3D masks. A recognition system essentially consists of two steps, the characteristic extraction step and the classification step. The method used for the extraction of characteristics is the polynomial decomposition, that yields the Legendre Moment Invariants (LMI), and the classifier is the well-known Support Vector Machines classifier. The obtained results prove that facial recognition systems can easily be deceived by 3D masks. To solve this fatal problem, a verification step, posterior to the recognition step is proposed to reject fake faces. In this step, the Legendre moments invariants are combined with the Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). This allowed us to reduce the error rate in discriminating between a real face and a face mask to approximately 0.90%.

Keywords—Face recognition, 3D face mask detection, Legendre Moment Invariants (LMI).

I. Introduction

In the everyday life, biometric systems are used in all fields, for example: access control to computers, e-commerce, Identity control, public transport, etc.

A biometric system is a pattern recognition system that uses biometric characteristics of an individual.

Several parts of the human being may be used as biometric features, among which are: the eyes, the face, and the fingerprints.

The face is one of the most used biometric modalities. That is because it is contactless, natural, well accepted and requires only a very inexpensive sensor (Webcam), present on all electronic devices. A face recognition system essentially consists of two steps, the characteristic

extraction step and the classification step. Face recognition has been one of the most treated subjects by the researchers since the 90s.

Several methods for face recognition have been published. The most popular are the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [1], and the Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [2].

Unfortunately, the progress in this domain is threatened by the fact that face recognition systems can be easily deceived by hackers. The experiments showed that hackers can easily fool facial recognition systems in the acquisition phase with a simple photo [3] or video record of the face. Fortunately, these two piracy methods have been neutralized.

Several works that aim to distinguish a true face from a 3D mask were published. In [4], the luminance of beams of light (685nm-850nm) is measured and used to form a feature vector that is classified by LDA. A 97.78% of good classification was reported. The drawback of this method is that the experiments were carried out directly on the material of masks and not on the masks.

In [5] the challenge was pushed further, since high resolution 3D masks, realized with 3D printers, were used. The masks are replicas of real subjects after extraction of the face details by a 3D scanner. The authors propose a method based on different Linear Binary Pattern (LBP) techniques to extract the characteristics from two types of images (color and depth). They claim a Half Total Error Rate (HTER) of 0.95% and 1.27%, for the color and depth images.

In our work we will also prove that a facial recognition system can easily be hacked by people who wear high resolution 3D masks. Then, we will propose a method to remedy this problem.

The proposed secured face recognition system is composed of two stages: a recognition stage and a verification stage. Both stages consist of a feature extraction phase and a verification phase. For the extraction of the face characteristics, we opted in the face recognition stage, for the 2D Legendre Moment Invariants (LMI), as in [6], whereas in the verification stage, we opted for a combination of the LMI and the LDA.

For the classification in both the recognition and verification stages, two methods, the Next Neighbor Classifier (NNC) and the Support Vector Machine (SVM) [7], were tested.

To prove that a facial recognition system is vulnerable to attacks with 3D mask we will test our recognition system on a database that is composed of people with real face and others who wear 3D masks. As a database we use, after the owners' authorization, the 3DMAD database that contains 3D masks of the real subjects.




Figure 1: The principle of detecting impostors in a face recognition system.

II. Face Feature Extraction

Many 2D face feature extraction techniques have been developed in recent years. As stated earlier, we have opted for the LMI and LDA based techniques, for their efficiency and simplicity.

a. The Legendre Moment Invariants

The LMI face feature vectors, $L_{m,n}$, extracted from a squared $N \times N$ image, $I(i,j)$, is given by the following equation:

$$L_{m,n} = \lambda_{m,n} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N I(i,j) \cdot P_m(x_i) \cdot P_n(y_j) \quad (1)$$

The normalization coefficient $\lambda_{m,n}$ is given by:

$$\lambda_{m,n} = \frac{(2m+1)(2n+1)}{(N-1)^2} \quad (2)$$

where the polynomial moment, $P_m(x)$, denotes the Legendre polynomial of order m , given by:

$$P_n(x) = \frac{1}{2^n(n)!} \frac{d^n(x^2 - 1)^n}{dx^n} \quad (3)$$

$$P_0(x) = 1$$

$$P_1(x) = x$$

$$P_{n+1}(x) = \frac{2 \cdot n + 1}{(n + 1)} x \cdot P_n(x) - \frac{n}{(n + 1)} \cdot P_{n-1}(x) \quad (4)$$

b. Linear Discriminant Analysis

We have found that combining the polynomial decomposition methods LMI with LDA to extract characteristics allows to discriminate between a face and a mask. LDA projection by the eigenvectors of the data dispersion matrix, aims to maximize inter-class variations while minimizing the intra-class variations. We must find an optimal W projection base that maximizes the intra-class dispersion related to the matrix S_w , and minimize the inter-class dispersion related to the matrix S_b .

To resolve this problem, we must find W which minimizes the Fisher optimization criterion Fisher $J(W)$:

$$W = \arg \max (J(W)) = \frac{|W^T S_b W|}{|W^T S_w W|} \quad (9)$$

W can be found by the resolution of the following eigenvalue equation:

$$S_b \cdot W = \lambda \cdot W \cdot S_w \cdot W \quad (10)$$

This problem reduces to a search problem of the eigenvectors of the matrix $S_w^{-1} \cdot S_b$.

III. Classification

Two classifiers were tested for the recognition and verification phases: the Next Neighbor Classifier (NCC) and the SVM classifier. The first one uses the Euclidean distance, which for two vectors, $X = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N)$ and $Y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_N)$, is defined by:

$$L2 = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^N |x_i - y_i|^2} \quad (11)$$

Support Vector Machines (SVM) may be used to solve discrimination problems, that is to say to decide to which class belongs a sample. It is originally a binary classification method that aims to find an optimal hyperplane that separates two classes, such that the margin (distance) of the elements of the two classes to this hyperplane is maximized. Using the training data the equation of the hyperplane may be formed and its solution may be found by using the Lagrange multipliers method. The original SVM requires that the data are linearly separable. When they are not, the problem can be solved by using the kernel functions. The most used ones are: the linear, the polynomial, and the Gaussian (RBF) kernels. Several methods may be used for the extension of the SVM to the multi-class classification problem. The one-versus-all method uses M binary classifiers, each classifier compares one class to the rest, whereas the one-versus-one method uses M.(M-1)/2 binary classifiers, each classifier compares one class to another class.

IV. Performance Evaluation

A. Protocol

1. The recognition phase

To prove that facial recognition systems are vulnerable to attacks by 3D masks, three sets were formed: a training set, a probe set, and a validation set.

-The training set is composed of 12 subjects out of the 17 subjects of the database. For each subject, we randomly selected 20 images of real face. This set is used to calculate the characteristic vectors.

- The validation set is composed of 240 different face images of the 12 same subjects used in the training phase, used to calculate False Rejection Rate (FRR), and 240 face images of the 5 subjects not used in the training phase, to calculate the False Acceptance Rate (FAR). Using this set Then Equal Error Rate (EER), i.e. the mean of the FAR and FRR, is calculated to determine the decision threshold, for the NCC classifier.

-The probe set is composed of 2 subsets: the first subset is composed of 240 different real face images of all of the 17 subjects in the database, to find the recognition rate. The second subset, composed of 240 face images with 3D masks of the 12 same subjects used in the training

phase, is used to calculate the Spoof False Acceptance Rate (SFAR).

2. The verification phase

To evaluate our verification method, we formed a training set, a validation set and a probe (test) set. Each set consists of two subsets: a subset with subjects with real faces and another with masks. Each subset contains 20 images of each one of the 12 subjects used in the recognition phase. The training set allows us to form our feature vectors matrix and the probe set allows us to calculate the False Fake Rate (FFR), where the real accesses are classified as mask attacks and the False Living Rate (FLR), where the mask attacks are classified as real accesses. The average of these two rates, called the Half Total Error Rate (HTER), is used as a criterion of evaluation.

The validation set is used to calculate the Equal Error Rate (EER), in order to fix the threshold for the NNC classifier.

B. Results

1. Recognition results

The recognition rates, for the two sets (probe, validation), obtained by the LMI method are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: The recognition rates obtained with the LMI method

	Validation Set	Probe Set
LMI SVM	97.20%	96.50%
LMI NNC	96.80%	96.95%

It can be said that this method of recognition gives good results on the 3DMAD database. The recognition rate is generally higher than 96% and the best results are obtained by the LMI method with classification by SVM.

The effectiveness of this recognition method has already been proved on databases with faces slightly inclined, like the ones used in our work [7]. We now present the results

of testing its immunity to 3D mask attacks. These results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: The Spoof False Acceptance Rate of the LMI method

	LMI SVM	LMI NNC
SFAR	66.80%	60.00%

It can be observed that the obtained spoof false acceptance rates are very high. Such high SFARs are unacceptable for a recognition system. A verification step is therefore necessary for its reduction.

2. Verification results

To evaluate the performance of the proposed verification method, the HTERs were calculated for the two sets (probe, validation) and for the two classifiers. These HTERs, together with the one obtained by another method, which uses the LBP and LDA [9] are given in Table 3. From this table, it can be stated that the proposed verification method manages to reject almost all fake faces and is therefore effective in protecting a recognition system against 3D mask attacks. It can also be observed that LMI+LDA with the SVM method slightly outperforms the LBP+LDA method.

Table 3: Comparison between the HTERs of the LMI+LDA and the LBP+LDA methods.

Method	LMI+LDA SVM	LMI+LDA NNC	LBP+LDA NNC
HTER	0.92%	1.10%	0.95%

VI. Conclusion

Nowadays, it is easy to mislead a recognition system by using high-resolution 3D masks, which can be easily designed thanks to the advances made in 3D printing technology.

In this article, we proposed a verification method to discriminate between a real face and a 3D mask to protect face based biometric systems, against spoofing. We have

validated our method on the 3DMAD, which is the only database that gives images of the subjects with real face and mask. The obtained results show the effectiveness of the proposed method as a countermeasure to attempts to spoof a face recognition system by 3D masks attacks. As perspective to this work, we plan to improve the method by merging the recognition and the verification steps.

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